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Abstract 
This paper provides a critical introduction to the most important phenomenological treatments of life. 
Formally, we may characterize these treatments as either reductive or non-reductive according to how 
they situate life ontologically vis-à-vis specifically human life, what the tradition calls “existence.” 
Whereas reductive or “existentialist” accounts posit an experiential continuum, a single horizon of 
disclosure articulated by structures which are present to varying degrees commensurate with 
organizational complexity, non-reductive accounts understand life and existence as modes of being 
in their own right, as defined by regimes of disclosure which are different in kind. On my reading, the 
Heidegger of the 1920s, his student Hans Jonas, and more recently, the French phenomenologist 
Renaud Barbaras fall into the reductivist camp, while the later (post-1930) Heidegger and Max 
Scheler can be counted among the non-reductivists. After briefly sketching out the respective 
positions, I suggest arguments in favour of the non-reductivist approach. 
 
1. Introduction: What is Life-Phenomenology? 
 
Life, as with all the foundational concepts of philosophical investigation – 
being, truth, the good – has the curious property of being at once too near and too 
far. In one sense, there is no great mystery about life. We can give a more or less 
stable, consistent, theoretically useful account of life in terms of biochemical 
states and processes. We can even speculate cogently about the more sublime 
cosmic origins of life (perhaps microscopic life is carried everywhere throughout 
the universe by meteoroids, as the theory of panspermia holds). To be sure, there 
are limit cases and lingering, perhaps insurmountable problems of definition. But 
on the whole these serve to confirm rather than undermine the strength of the 
scientific account of life. Indeed, it is that very strength and intelligibility which 
provide the background against which such problems and limits can first appear 
and make sense at all, as they do. 
In another sense, however, life eludes us entirely. If upon reflection we are 
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inclined to describe life, generally speaking, in scientific terms, this is not the way 
we typically think and talk about life in ordinary language. If I say “Lazarus rose 
from the dead,” I certainly do not mean that Lazarus suddenly began to maintain 
homeostasis or that he reacquired the ability to adapt to conditions in his 
environment. If when baking a loaf of bread I open a sachet of yeast and wonder 
whether it is alive, it is possible that I am simply asking whether it works – but it 
is equally possible that I am asking a question about what it means to attribute 
“living” to this little pile of brown dust at all. In this case, I am not asking whether 
it is in fact capable of performing some kind of energy-yielding chemical 
exchange, but rather whether that itself and as such bears any relation to, or is in 
any way commensurate with, what I know and understand of life. 
The success of the scientific account of life is due to the way in which it 
objectifies life. It sets life apart, as the defining feature of living beings, in order 
to make various empirical, or “ontic,” determinations about it. Life becomes 
comprehensible just to the extent that it remains something external, other. Even 
when we apply these empirical determinations to ourselves, it is only insofar as 
we bring ourselves into focus and take stock of ourselves, from the privileged 
position of the abstract distance opened up by the theoretical gaze, as equally 
objectified, as bearers of life taken as a set of features characteristic of certain 
kinds of organized systems. Likewise, it is only because life is held in focus in 
this way that local disagreements can arise concerning precisely which features 
belong to life and which do not. On the other hand, the life that we know and refer 
to in an average everyday way is manifestly not of this sort. It is rather the life 
that we know subjectively, “from the inside,” as it were. The special vantage point 
here is not that of the theorist who stands over and against life as an object of 
study but instead that of the living – one who lives out or lives through life, one 
for whom life is not merely another thing encountered in the world but rather a 
condition of encountering anything at all, not something experienced so much as 
a horizon of experientiality. 
Whenever we apprehend life in this way, from out of the midst of its very 
living, we understand life not ontico-empirically but ontologically, as a mode of 
being definitive of certain kinds of beings. What we see, more precisely, is the 
way in which what it means to be a being of a certain sort is a matter of what is 
given to such a being and how it, in turn, is open to, encounters, and relates to the 
given in its givenness. As beings whose way of being is (at least partially) 
determined by life, we are what we are precisely in our opening up onto, having, 
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and negotiating what manifests itself to us in just those ways which accord with 
life. 
To be sure, this is not to suggest that in our average everyday understanding 
of life we carry around and wield sophisticated ontological theories of life. The 
problem is rather just the opposite. If the scientific account of life makes life 
intelligible and manageable only at the cost of a certain artificial distanciation and 
objectification of life, the problem with our everyday understanding of life is that 
life is far too near and intimate to be able to say anything meaningful about it at 
all. That which puts us in touch with the very being of life at the same time ensures 
that this being forever escapes us. What we call the “mystery” of life resides 
precisely here, in the aporia of life’s ineluctable disclosure in retreat. To wonder 
at life is at once our prerogative and our curse. Stranded in the χώρα between 
absolute knowing and absolute ignorance, we are stirred and solicited by life 
despite, or rather because of, its very elusiveness. Intuitively, we all know that life 
exceeds – essentially – the sum of its biochemical concomitants, but the meaning 
of this excess seems structurally and permanently out of reach. 
When we ponder the possibility and meaning of the life of that sachet of yeast, 
we are above all questioning the silent ontological assumptions of the scientific 
account itself. We are asking, in essence, whether and how anything like a “living 
out” can be attributed to this stuff – whether it admits of any sort of relation to the 
given in its givenness, even formally. Of course we do not doubt that this stuff 
does what science says it does. Rather we are asking if that is all life really is. Is 
this stuff “open” in any meaningful sense? Does anything “appear” to it in any 
way, and how? And does that matter? It is in this way that reflection on the 
empirical determinants of life quietly but inevitably passes over into philosophical 
speculation about the being of life. 
How, then, shall we approach life in its most mysterious aspect? Can 
philosophy provide any insight into what our everyday proximity to life always 
already withholds from us? Does philosophy have any resources by means of 
which we might step into the midst of actually lived life and describe what is given 
to life in the specificity of its givenness? 
Generally speaking, whenever philosophy situates itself within the midst of 
the given in order to isolate and describe some cohesive set of formal structures 
of givenness, it is phenomenology. Formal structures here means neither 
empirico-psychological features nor a priori transcendental conditions, but rather 
something like “schemata” which articulate and specify an ontologically 
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determinate horizon of disclosure. Methodologically, then, phenomenology 
necessarily begins with some procedure of “bracketing” (epoché), a shifting of 
orientation or perspective by which the so-called “natural attitude” characteristic 
of unreflective, pre-philosophical daily life is suspended or disqualified in order 
that the particular horizon at issue (pure consciousness, being-in-the-world, 
perception etc.) can be set off and held in focus. In this way the given is 
apprehended not as object but precisely as given in conformity with these 
schemata, that is, as phenomenon. To take a simple and classic example, when I 
stand at the lectern, I position myself vis-à-vis an object of a certain size, shape, 
texture, and weight, and with a certain number of sides etc. From the perspective 
of pure consciousness, however, all that is ever given to me is a never-ending 
series of partial images, or “adumbrations,” that together constitute an objective 
unity structurally shot through with incompleteness, negation (such that I never 
have the “whole” object in view, or more precisely, there is a “hole” structured 
into and constitutive of the “whole” itself). 
To ask whether and how we might situate ourselves in the midst of life with 
an eye to its concrete being-lived is thus simply to ask about the possibility of a 
phenomenology of life. It is to ask whether we can in fact discover any such 
general experiential forms or patterns that would justify an interpretation of life 
as a horizon of openness in its own right. More specifically, it means asking 
whether any being that can be said to partake of this experiential horizon “has” 
things in certain ways that are exclusive to such partaking and therefore withheld 
from all beings we regard as standing outside it. To return to our yeast example, 
if we were to attribute life to this pile of dust in a phenomenological and not 
merely a biochemical sense (and ignoring as irrelevant the metaphysical problem 
of the possible relation between these), this would mean committing ourselves to 
the view that the yeast “has” things in ways that non-living entities (actual dust, 
for example) do not – ways that, moreover, are formally identical to the “ways-
of-having” characteristic of everything that lives (whether plankton or people). 
What would such a “having” entail? Or, put differently, what does it mean to be 
in a “living” sort of way? 
 
2. Reductivist and Non-Reductivist Approaches to Life 
 
Historically, philosophical attempts to provide a phenomenological account 
of life have tended to fall into two general camps, what I will call reductivist and 
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non-reductivist. On the reductivist side I count, for example, the early Heidegger, 
his student Hans Jonas, and the contemporary French phenomenologist Renaud 
Barbaras. On the non-reductivist side I include the later (roughly post-1929) 
Heidegger and Max Scheler. Reductivists are so named because they posit a single 
mode of being, “life,” of which the way of being characteristic of human beings, 
what the tradition calls “existence,” is only a particular moment or local 
modification. At the same time, the description of the lived content of life is 
modelled on human existence itself as life’s most advanced form and the 
completion of its “evolutionary ascent.” The reductivist itinerary is succinctly 
expressed by Jonas when he writes in The Phenomenon of Life that his aim is to 
provide “an ‘existential’ interpretation of biological facts” so as to “recover the 
inner dimension” which is necessary “for the understanding of things organic.”1 
Reductivism, in other words, proceeds in two directions at once: ontologically it 
collapses existence into (a mode of) life, while ontically it arrives at the concrete 
reality of life by way of a “privation” of the basic structures of existence (the so-
called “existentialia”) as the end and summit of life’s own teleological unfolding. 
(For this reason, we may use the terms reductivist, existentialist, and teleological 
interchangeably.) Non-reductivists naturally reject this approach. In place of an 
unbroken chain of being culminating in “existential life,” they posit a kind of 
“ontological surprise” irrupting into being itself – the spontaneous emergence of 
an entirely sui generis field of manifestation and relation. 
 
2.1. Reductivism: Early Heidegger, Jonas, Barbaras 
 
Reductivism can be characterized as a form of onto-phenomenological 
monism. This does not mean a metaphysical theory according to which the totality 
of being is conscious or pre-conscious (though it is certainly compatible with such 
a view: Jonas himself advances a neo-Schellingian Naturphilosophie whereby 
human Spirit is “adumbrated” in the lowest forms of inorganic matter). Rather it 
means only that the principal distinction to be drawn is between non-openness 
and openness simpliciter; in positing a single horizon of openness, it treats all 
openness as such as formally-ontologically identical. This horizon is known 
simply as world. World, Jonas says, is “the basic setting for experience – a horizon 
of co-reality thrown open by life.”2 In the same way, for the early Heidegger, the 
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“phenomenological category, ‘world,’ immediately names…what is lived, the 
content aimed at in living, that which life holds to.”3 The essence of life is 
therefore “being-in-a-world,” such that anything that lives, from protozoa to 
primates, must be said to have a world. That the terms “life” and “world” have the 
same fundamental meaning, Heidegger says, is expressed in ordinary language by 
the fact that “the one word can stand in for the other: e.g. ‘to go out into life,’ ‘out 
into the world’; ‘to live totally in one’s world,’ ‘totally in one’s life.’”4 In a 
passage that will surely sound strange to anyone familiar only with his later work, 
Heidegger insists on the basic and irreducible enworldedness of all living beings: 
 
Life is that kind of reality which is in a world and indeed in such a way that 
it has a world. Every living creature has its environing world not as 
something extant next to it but as something that is there for it as disclosed, 
uncovered…[Biologists] are now reflecting on the fundamental structure of 
the animal. But we miss the essential thing here if we don’t see that the 
animal has a world. In the same way, we too are always in a world in such 
a way that it is disclosed for us.5 
 
Accordingly, onto-phenomenological monism implies that all differences in the 
lived content of life can amount only to ontico-empirical differences in the world-
relation itself. If human existence and plant and animal life are not separated by 
an unbridgeable “abyss,” then there is only ever being-in-a-world more or less…, 
a continuum of what Jonas describes as “rising degrees of world-perception” and 
“scope and distinctness of experience” culminating in the human λόγος. Both 
Jonas and the early Heidegger share this teleological view of the ontologico-
evolutionary ascent of life. Jonas leaves no room for ambiguity or 
misinterpretation here: 
 
[There] is always the purposiveness of organism as such and its concern in 
living: effective already in all vegetative tendency, awakening to primordial 
awareness in the dim reflexes, the responding irritability of lowly 
organisms; more so in urge and effort and anguish of animal life endowed 
with motility and sense-organs; reaching self-transparency in 
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consciousness, will and thought of man: all these being inward aspects of 
the teleological side…of “matter.”6 
 
Indeed, Jonas traces the line of ascent to humanity back to bare matter itself, 
whose properties “found their opportunity along the course of mechanical 
evolution to realize, in the seeming automatism of causal sequence, some of the 
hidden potentialities of original substance: of which realization we are 
instances.”7 Conversely, “the more we descend to the lower rungs of the ladder 
of life-forms,” the more do these “hidden potentialities” dissolve back into their 
primordially constitutive elements, first into “obscure sensations” and the 
“elementary stimulation of organic irritability,” and ultimately into the “primeval 
restlessness of metabolizing substance”8 itself. Heidegger, likewise, although he 
shares none of Jonas’s idealist metaphysical leanings, advances essentially the 
same view. When Heidegger writes that “[everything] that is alive, to the extent 
that it exists, has a world, which does not hold for what is not alive,”9 it is clear 
that he is treating “existence” as the highest expression of life insofar as it involves 
the greatest “extent” of world. The essential point, to be clear, is not merely that 
the horizon of life expands and contracts corollary to the external development of 
the organism, but more fundamentally, that the ontologically defining features of 
life are already present, in nuce, even in the most primitive and germinal 
manifestations of life. This is why Heidegger can claim that even the most 
rudimentary life-form “knows about itself, even if only in the dullest way and in 
the broadest sense.”10 Whereas a stone, say, is simply “on hand,” even a “very 
primitive unicellular form of life…will already find itself,” though such self-
finding (Befindlichkeit) may be no more than “the greatest and darkest dullness.”11 
As for these ontologically defining features themselves, the lived substance of 
being-in-the-world, it is now easy to see that a certain “method” is implied. For if 
life is an experiential continuum of which the human stands at and as the summit 
in virtue of a “psychological totality which represents the maximum of concrete 
ontological completeness,” it follows that the essential meaning of this lived 
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substance is “determined by way of progressive ontological subtraction,”12 a kind 
of “reductive biology” whereby, as Heidegger says, we “determine the worldhood 
of the animal by certain modified ways of considering”13 our own world-relation. 
Now we know life just insofar as, and in the way that, we ourselves live it, namely, 
as resistance to what stands over and against us as a domain of opposition and 
constraint. For reductivists, accordingly, alienation is the basic experience and 
setting of all life: the living being forges its “internal identity,” first awakens to 
self-consciousness, in the struggle with finitude, its Sisyphean reckoning with the 
external powers that confront it and ultimately threaten it with death. In his 
summer semester lectures from 1925, Heidegger gives the example of a snail 
crawling out of its shell. Is the snail “in” its environment in the way that water is 
“in” a glass? Does the snail first encounter a world only by reaching itself out to 
something which it thereby, in and through such reaching, discovers as “not-
itself”? By no means. Rather, having a world is the a priori condition of its 
reaching out and encountering anything to begin with. The snail’s crawling out of 
its shell, Heidegger writes, “is but a local modification of its already-being-in-the-
world. Even when it is in its shell, its being is a being-outside, rightly understood. 
It is not in its shell like water in the glass”; rather “it has a world” from the 
beginning and essentially.14 But what sort of world is this? Fundamentally, “a 
world described as standing over and against it, an opposition which it broaches 
by first crawling out.” Jonas takes this abstract idea of the world as a zone of 
originary “opposition” to its logical conclusion. For Jonas, the dawn of life is itself 
“the emergence, with life as such, of internal identity,” but in that very emergence, 
life’s “self-isolation too from all the rest of reality.” Thus – 
 
Profound singleness and heterogeneousness within a universe of 
homogeneously interrelated existence mark the selfhood of organism. An 
identity which from moment to moment reasserts itself, achieves itself, and 
defies the equalizing forces of physical sameness all around, is truly pitted 
against the rest of things. In the hazardous polarization thus ventured upon 
by emerging life, that which is not itself and borders on the realm of internal 
identity from without assumes at once the character of absolute otherness. 
The challenge of selfhood qualifies all this beyond the boundaries of the 
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organism as foreign and somehow opposite: as “world,” in which, by which, 
and against which it is committed to maintain itself. Without this universal 
counterpart of otherness, there would be no “self.”15 
 
We are not far from the philosophy of Fichte here, for whom “infinite striving,” 
the “ceaseless struggle against a hostile world,” is “the condition of the possibility 
of all objects, of experiencing a world opposed to our activity.”16 Just as for 
Fichte neither self nor world can appear except in and through their mutual 
limitation, so too for Jonas and early Heidegger life just is the opening up of a 
zone of opposition tout court. Such opposition is the meaning of the “in” of the 
living being’s “being-in” its world. 
Although he comes armed with a more sophisticated conceptual toolkit, the 
contemporary French phenomenologist Renaud Barbaras takes essentially the 
same view. Like Jonas and early Heidegger, Barbaras thinks “existence in terms 
of life,” that is, not an addition to life “but only a new dimension of life.”17 
Moreover, “that to which life relates and that at which life is aimed”18 is the 
unitary horizon of “world,” which, as before, is described as inherently 
provocative and “alienating,” such that life is condemned to eternal restlessness 
and unsatisfactoriness. The main difference is that whereas Jonas, for example, 
understands alienation in terms of the threat of lost continuity of being (in short, 
of death), Barbaras locates it more anciently, in the nature of manifestation, i.e. 
“be-ing,” as such. 
Life, Barbaras writes, “is the condition of the appearance of a being that is 
absent from what presents it.”19 Because being necessarily retreats and recedes 
behind the manifold “adumbrations” by and through which it appears, “the being 
offers itself up to an exploration that is, in principle, unending.” For Barbaras, this 
a priori incompleteness and opacity of the world are the ontological corollary of 
a movement out toward the world. By a logic which is never entirely made clear 
(and which non-reductivism will call out and contest, even if only implicitly), it 
is precisely because the world “continuously slips away from the gaze that it is 
given as the end or goal of a movement.” The being solicits in its very withdrawal 
– “it offers itself up as a weak directionality because it cannot be possessed in an 
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intuition.”20 
Life, in short, is “desire,” that is, an impossible yet irrepressible drawing 
nearer toward what, if the integrity of life itself is to be conserved, can and must 
never come forth to meet or fulfil it. Desire does not first experience an object to 
which it subsequently draws near; just to the contrary, “it only experiences its 
object in advancing towards it,” in the sense that “it does not become conscious 
of its object except through the momentum with which it approaches it.” Thus 
insofar as desire is always already too late, “what desire reaches exacerbates as 
much as appeases it.” Desire “never meets its object except in the mode of the 
object’s own absence, and this is why nothing stops it.” It follows that what 
“fulfils” desire “only serves to further hollow it out,” which is “why it can only 
be effectuated as movement.” Life is what Plato called a “leaky jar”: it is the 
“insatiable advance of desire” which corresponds to “the non-positive excess of 
the world.”21 
It therefore matters little that Barbaras faults Jonas’s account for being too 
death centred. It is not the fact of finitude to which Barbaras objects, but only its 
origin and logic. Non-being does not stand opposed to being as subject to object, 
but rather inscribes the object itself and from the beginning. Accordingly, 
Barbaras arrives at the same fundamental interpretation of life, though by a 
different route and in a more originary sense. Life remains “an attempt at self-
realization” through “the mediation of an other” that resists it, only now resistance 
is understood in terms not of a “defiance” of the “equalizing forces of physical 
sameness” (Jonas) but of an originary self-refusal of the world itself. There is no 
essential break here with the interpretations of Jonas and early Heidegger. Where 
Heidegger speaks of the “opposition” of the world and Jonas the radical 
“fitfulness” and “deep anxiety of biological existence,”22 Barbaras invokes the 
romantic language of being “condemned” to a perpetual “longing” for the world. 
“Subjectivity is precisely the unity of this loss and this longing” – life “refers back 
to the event of a loss of its existence that takes the form of a longing.” If life is 
“characterized by a fundamental alienation,” this means not any struggle against 
hostile external forces but rather its a priori condition, “a lack of Being that 
prohibits [the subject] from ever fully being what it is and without which it would 
not even begin to desire, and hence, exist.” Life signals the birth of a self to be 
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realized in and through its pursuit of a world that structurally refuses it. As “a 
search for the self in the other,” life “is condemned to a never-ending quest, the 
insatiability of which is the measure of the subject’s self-privation.” 23  Such 
originary privation is “the advent of living being” – a “living that refers back to 
life as a form of scission deep within its core, that is to say, fundamentally, as its 
negation.”24 
 
2.2. Non-Reductivism: The Later Heidegger and Scheler 
 
For non-reductivists, the central problem with the teleological-existential 
view of life is that it leaves no room for the specificity of human life, which is 
now understood simply as a qualitatively enhanced manifestation of life in general. 
Ultimately the thesis of ontological continuity breaks down inasmuch as, if all life 
is an originary unsatisfactoriness vis-à-vis the world, we are compelled to 
maintain that even primitive life is constituted by what seem to be 
paradigmatically human forms of experience. If I see a garden snail munching on 
a leaf, there is a high burden of proof to meet indeed if I am to insist that the best 
interpretation of what this creature is doing is that it is fighting to maintain the 
integrity of its felt experience of selfhood against a hostile external world or, still 
more abstractly, that it is irresistibly solicited by the structural negation lurking at 
the heart of being itself. This raises the suspicion that reductivism is motivated 
above all by ethical concerns – and indeed it is clear that Jonas, for example, and 
for precisely this reason, simply cannot make up his mind about the ontological 
status of human life. At the very same time he claims that all life is subject to 
evolutionary ascent, he carves out a special subset of sui generis human faculties 
– representation, memory, self-creation – which emerge fully formed. But in that 
case, why does this special class of properties not also extend to such things as 
awareness of self and anxiety about death? Conversely, why do these special 
faculties not likewise appear in “rising degrees”?25 
Precisely these concerns are what motivate the non-reductivist theories of 
Scheler and the later Heidegger. The early Heidegger could advance a teleologico-
existential view of life on account of the fact that his main concern was rescuing 
life from what he saw as its illegitimate though near constant objectification by 
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the tradition from Plato onward. Thus Heidegger writes that the entire subject-
object schema “fundamentally and forever obstructs access to that which we have 
indicated with the term ‘factical life.’”26 Operating within this schema, “the basic 
phenomenon of being-in-the-world does not come into view.”27 In opposition to 
all theoretical “de-interpretation” and “de-vivification” of life, 28  Heidegger 
describes life as pure openness – a primordial “it lives” (es lebt) or, insofar as all 
living is in, through, against etc. a world, “it worlds” (es weltet) simpliciter.29 
Given the focus of this early philosophical itinerary, it is not surprising that 
Heidegger would, at this stage, think life in wholly universal terms. When the 
agenda is principally one of destructing all overly “theoretical” accounts of the 
subject, there is no reason not to regard animals and even plants as partaking of 
the same being-in-the-world as human beings, though to lesser degrees. Life (ζωή), 
Heidegger insists, “refers to a mode of being, indeed a mode of being-in-a-world. 
A living thing is not simply at hand (vorhanden), but is in a world in that it has a 
world. An animal is not simply moving down the road, pushed along by some 
mechanism. It is in the world in the sense of having it.”30 It is only later, in the 
process of working through the implications of his fundamental ontology, that 
Heidegger recognizes and clarifies that the kind of world-relation he has been 
describing could only first arise at all if it supervened on deeper structures (namely, 
time and what it makes possible, an understanding of being) that were, to all 
appearances (specifically, the living being’s alogia as the “sign” of the absence of 
such structures), the ontological prerogative of certain living beings exclusively, 
namely, us ourselves – and accordingly insists on an essential rupture within the 
open itself. 
This “turn” in Heidegger’s thinking about life, though long in preparation, is 
accomplished quite suddenly. As late as 1927, Heidegger is still speaking 
(cautiously, to be sure) in terms of a continuum of life ranging from the “mere” 
life of plants and animals to the “existential” life of human beings, and thus of the 
possibility of “making out reductively” how the animal might experience its 
“world.”31 By the time of the seminal winter semester lectures on theoretical 
biology two years later (titled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
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Finitude, Solitude), however, the problematic has shifted entirely. Inasmuch as it 
was simply a matter of emancipating the primordial openness of the “it 
lives/worlds” from all occluding and inappropriate objectification, Heidegger had 
no trouble invoking the “very simple” world of a “primitive animal,”32 and even 
speculating about the possibility of understanding the animal’s world “by certain 
modified ways of considering” our own world. By contrast, once it is determined 
that the animal is “poor in world” (weltarm) – that whatever the animal “has,” it 
does not have beings qua beings – such an itinerary becomes unintelligible. For 
in that case “it is not simply a question of a qualitative otherness of the animal 
world as compared with the human world, and especially not a question of 
quantitative distinctions in range, depth, and breadth” – as in any reductive 
account of “primitive” being-in-the-world. Indeed, “it is not a question of whether 
or how the animal takes what is given to it in a different way, but rather of whether 
or how the animal can apprehend something as something, something as a being, 
at all. If it cannot, then the animal is separated from man by an abyss.” 33 
Accordingly, the 1929-30 lectures are concerned above all with “finding out what 
constitutes the essence of the animality of the animal and the essence of the 
humanity of man,” and the former by way of an ontological determination of “the 
living character of a living being” as such34 – and indeed Heidegger pauses no 
fewer than seven times in the first thirty pages of the biology material to remind 
us, often emphatically, that “life” and “living-being” refer always and exclusively 
to the plant-being of the plant and the animal-being of the animal, never to the 
human-being, the “existence,” of the human. 
Heidegger’s contemporary Max Scheler held a similar position about life. 
Like the later Heidegger, Scheler argued that human reality exhibited structures 
and properties that were different in kind from those observed in all other living 
beings, and therefore that human beings, though undoubtedly “alive,” could never 
be defined ontologically by their participation in life. Human reality is not simply 
“above” life, but rather situated on an entirely different plane of being – the plane 
of spirit. This “novel phenomenon” is not merely “an addition to the psychic 
levels of impulsion, instinct, associative memory, [and] intelligence.” Rather, 
“[this] new principle is beyond what we call ‘life’ in the widest meaning of the 
word. What makes the human being a ‘human’ is not a new level of life,” but 
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something “opposite anything we call life, including life in the human being: it is 
a genuinely new, essential fact which cannot at all be reduced to the ‘natural 
evolution of life.’ If reducible to anything at all, this new principle leads us back 
to the one ultimate Ground of all entities of which life happens to be one particular 
manifestation.”35 
In his last published work, the short text The Human Place in the Cosmos (an 
expanded version of a presentation titled “The Special Place of Humankind” 
delivered at a conference in 1927, one year before his death and two years before 
Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts lectures), Scheler defines the essence of spirit 
in terms of an “existential detachment from organic being.” In other words, “a 
being having spirit is not tied anymore to its drives and environment, but is ‘non-
environmental,’” that is, “‘world-open’: such a being has ‘world.’”36 As with the 
later Heidegger, “world” is thought as the horizon of manifestation of beings qua 
beings. Whereas merely living beings “are ecstatically immersed in their environs,” 
a being that partakes of spirit “turns its centres of resistance and reaction into 
‘objects’ in order to grasp the ‘what’ of all objects itself.” Spirit, therefore, 
involves “matter-of-factness” (Sachlichkeit) in that it is “determinable by ‘what’ 
things themselves are.” Whereas an animal “is unable to turn the environment into 
an object” – that is, “is not removed from its environment and does not have 
distance from its environment so as to be able to transform its ‘environment’ into 
‘world’” – in contrast, “the being of objects is the most formal category of the 
logical side of spirit.”37 
This lack of “Seinsverständnis,” “being-understanding,” implies, a fortiori, 
that the animal, despite being conscious, can never possess that inward subjective 
consolidation or “in-gathering” (Sammlung) which we call “self” and “selfhood.” 
Unlike “the simple reporting-back of the contents of an animal’s lived body 
schema, the human spiritual act is tied essentially to a second dimension or second 
level of the act of reflection,” namely, “‘concentration on one’s own self,’ or the 
consciousness of the spiritual act-centre of itself, ‘self-consciousness.’” An 
animal, to be sure, is “conscious,” but it “does not own itself, it has no power over 
itself – and this is why it is also not aware of itself.”38 This, in turn, suggests that 
the essence of the reductive-existential picture of life – namely, life as a congenital 
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“fitfulness” and “unsatisfactoriness” vis-à-vis what stands over and against it as 
hostile, alien, foreign, inaccessible otherness – is unintelligible and untenable. For 
it is precisely because “an animal does not have a specific kind of self-centredness 
that unifies all sense data with its respective drive impulses and that releases the 
one ‘world’ ordered by the senses” that it has no experience of that “lack which 
is not a lack of this or that” (as Merleau-Ponty calls it39) which lurks at the root of 
all desire. Rather, desire “can only occur in a being having spirit and whose lack 
of satisfaction of its drives is always more than its satisfaction.” What the animal 
lacks, in short, is the temporal dimension that first opens up that horizon of 
expectation – the experience of never enough, the ceaseless approach to the ever-
still-outstanding – on which desire necessarily depends. Thus, “[we] call ‘empty’ 
what remains unsatisfied in the expectations of our drives – the primary 
‘emptiness’ which is, as it were, the emptiness in our hearts.”40 Man is “an eternal 
‘Faust’ or a bestia cupidissima rerum novarum,” one who “is never at peace with 
his environing world,” “always eager to break through the borders of now-here-
whatness,” and “always desirous to transcend the reality surrounding him, 
including the reality of his own self.”41 Being may very well be inscribed with an 
irreparable negation, as Barbaras maintains, but this fact is meaningful only to 
beings who are already “temporally primed,” as it were, to perceive it – and in 
perceiving it, to first become a subject as the subject of it, that is, as stirred and 
solicited by it, as essentially lacking or unrealized vis-à-vis being’s immanent 
withdrawal and concealment. This is why, unlike the animals, “who always say 
‘Yes’ to reality – even when they fear and flee – the human being is the ‘Nay-
sayer,’ he is an ascetic of life; he is an eternal protester against all mere reality.”42 
It is easy to see that non-reductivism is at a relative disadvantage when it 
comes to describing and interpreting the structures and meaning of “mere” life, 
for it is no longer a matter of simply “modifying” – paring down and peeling away 
– the contents of our own lived-experience to arrive at “the worldhood of the 
animal.” Rather we must attempt a procedure which is more akin to Bergsonian 
intuition than Husserlian epoché. Whereas for Jonas the reality of life is laid bare 
by “progressive ontological subtraction” from the “maximum of concrete 
ontological completeness” which is man, for Scheler the essence of life can only 
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be glimpsed by means of something like what Foucault will later call “limit-
experiences” – an attempt to neutralize or “inactivate” spirit. “If we try to place 
ourselves into the everyday state of an animal’s being,” Scheler writes, “we would 
have to think of very rare human ecstatic states – as they occur, for instance, 
during the receding stages of hypnosis, or during the intake of certain drugs, and 
we would also have to think of techniques that inactivate spirit, such techniques 
as are used by orgiastic cults.”43 
Much hay has been made of this interpretation of animal consciousness (the 
experiential content of life in general, in fact) as akin to drugged, doped, orgiastic, 
or hypnotized human consciousness, life as a rhapsody of impressions. It is true 
that both the later Heidegger and Scheler describe the living being as driven 
around within its “environment ring.” Scheler’s claim that living beings “are 
ecstatically immersed in their environs,” whereby “[the] structure of the 
environment fits exactly to, and is ‘fixated’ in, the physiological peculiarity of an 
animal,” such that everything it experiences “in its environment is securely 
embedded in the frame and boundary of its environment,”44 is perfectly echoed 
in Heidegger’s own claim that “[being] open in captivation is the essential 
possession of the animal,” such that the animal’s “being held captive to the 
disinhibiting ring” is “a having of that which disinhibits.”45 But here we should 
be sensitive to the full difficulty of the task at hand. The point is not to deny things 
to life so much as to circumscribe what belongs most properly to life. Thus just as 
Heidegger suggests that the openness of life may be so rich and abundant that “the 
human world may have nothing to compare”46 it with, so too Scheler goes so far 
as to claim that “[gifts], readiness to help, reconciliation, and similar observable 
facts one can find already among animals.”47 The problem is not the potential 
experiential richness of life but how this richness is to be interpreted – how, in 
other words, to think a kind of primordial Fichtean “resistance” of things which 
would be anterior to any “hermeneutic” disclosure, that is, any givenness of things 
as the things that they are, and still less as beings as such. This is what Scheler is 
getting at when he says that a living being “does not experience its drives as its 
drives but as dynamic attractions or rejections coming from things in its 
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environment.”48 “Things” in this sense are not beings but rather something like 
nodes of resistance, densities of attractiveness and repulsiveness simpliciter; the 
idea is that something can manifest itself not as an attractive or repulsive being 
but merely as attractive or as repulsive as such. 
Heidegger floats a similar view in his Aristotle lectures from the mid-1920s 
(technically still carried out within the framework of a continuity theory of being-
in-the-world, but there is nothing here that, in principle, the post-1930 Heidegger 
could not agree with). In these lectures, animal life is defined not by νοῡς, a pure 
observation or theoretical knowing, but rather by ὄρεξις, “desire” as a yearning or 
longing going-out-toward an ὀρεκτόν, a “desirable” simpliciter. Desire indicates 
the way in which the world matters to animals; it takes the form, not of an 
insatiable restlessness vis-à-vis the ineliminable provocations of non-being, but 
rather and simply of a δίωξις or φύξις (or φῦγή), a pursuit or avoidance (or flight), 
vis-à-vis what is disclosed and engaged as διακείμενον and ἀντικείμενον, the 
“disposed-to” and “opposed-to” as such. There exists, in other words, an entirely 
sui generis orectic form of manifestation: things can stand unconcealed, indeed 
can stand in a certain kind of “truth” (ἀλήθεια), and yet not “be” anything at all 
sensu stricto. Through ἁφή, “contact,” life orients itself to what discloses itself as 
favourable or threatening, as desirable or undesirable, as διακείμενον or 
ἀντικείμενον: an animal crawls up a tree trunk “so that it has the trunk in a certain 
way as its obstacle, so that the trunk with which it is there is nonetheless there for 
it as διακείμενον, ἀντικείμενον for the animal through ἁφή, through ‘contact.’”49 
This attempt to think resistance without being is what separates the “deepest 
and darkest dullness” predicated of primitive or “mere,” that is, qualitatively 
reduced or subtracted, life from the “benumbment” (Benommenheit) which 
Scheler and the later Heidegger posit as the essence of life taken as a mode of 
being in its own right. The latter represents not a lesser form of life but rather how 
life is destined to appear to us when we try to deactivate or step outside the source 
and substance of our very humanity. 
 
3. Conclusion: The Case for Non-Reductivism 
 
What I wish to suggest, in closing, is that non-reductivism has the upper hand 
not only theoretically but above all ethically. Phenomenologically speaking, life 
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is the mode of being concomitant with the spontaneous opening up of a zone of 
solicitation and repulsion. It is originary movement in the form of a ceaseless 
drawing-toward and pushing-away-from things – things which give themselves 
not as “beings” to pursue or to avoid but as the pursuable and avoidable as such, 
as it were. To live means simply to dwell in the midst of this zone, in the manner 
of such a movement. Conversely, what we call human existence is not just a more 
sophisticated manifestation or expression of such movement but rather a mode of 
being in its own right – one defined, at the most elementary level, by the 
experience of time. The immediate upshot of this is that we obviate entirely the 
kinds of problems that seem inevitable for reductivism (whose reductio ad 
absurdum is the existential angst of plants and protozoa). The “fundamental 
incompleteness” and radical “experience of dispossession”50 which reductivists 
such as Barbaras claim to discover at the heart of life are essentially temporal 
phenomena. As Levinas puts it, “in Desire there is no sinking one’s teeth into 
being, no satiety, but an uncharted future before me.”51 The negation of the world 
is here not mere logical not-being but rather the deeper, existential non-being of 
unfulfillment. This means that Barbaras’s effort to “think existence in terms of life” 
ultimately fails; his “‘additive’ anthropology” does not “replace the privative 
zoology”52 of the early Heidegger and Jonas but rather smuggles it in from the 
start as its silent presupposition. 
The problem with non-reductivism, on the other hand, at least as we are 
inclined to see it today, is that it appears to be ethically dubious in the way in 
which it cannot avoid “denying” certain things to non-human living creatures, 
such as the capacity to truly die as opposed to merely “perish” (Derrida, for one, 
famously addresses this issue in works such as Of Spirit and The Animal That 
Therefore I Am). Indeed, Jonas’s own life-phenomenology was motivated mainly 
by ethical concerns insofar as he thought that our technological transformation, 
now bordering on annihilation, of nature was due in large part to our failure to 
understand life in the context of the continuity and interconnectedness of the 
totality of being. 
As I see it, however, this is to get things backwards. Our technological 
domination and decimation of nature – the whole monstrous techno-capitalist 
juggernaut which now threatens us with collective destruction in the form of the 
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climate emergency, and the will to power that underpins and fuels it – stems 
precisely from that constitutional restlessness, unsatisfactoriness, and anxiety 
which reductivists are so eager to discover in life itself. This is why there is always 
something slightly sinister in the blind urge to demote the human to a mere animal 
and to “elevate” the animal to a human being (formally, if always to a lesser 
extent). The problem is not merely that the animal is presumed to lack something 
vis-à-vis the human – not simply, in other words, that the thing which is left out 
is assumed to be something inherently good such that its omission in itself entails 
a kind of violence to the animal. The problem is instead that this purportedly good 
thing of which the animal is deprived is precisely that which, if present, would 
implicate it in the most obscene forms of violence – just as, by the same token, 
the human being’s own singular responsibility for such violence would be 
correspondingly blurred, muted, redistributed among life as such and as a whole. 
For if the radical, constitutional insatiability which compels the will to power is a 
product of the restlessness of life as such, then man no longer owns it – it is simply 
“the way of Nature.” The difference between an animal catching its prey on the 
one hand and the will to infinite, exponential growth on the other becomes one of 
degree, not of kind. The animal is gripped by the same will to power as that which 
drives, say, the typical Wall Street banker or the board of directors of Exxon 
Mobil; what it lacks is merely the “intelligence” necessary for implementing its 
will more “efficiently.” Conversely, and for the same reason, bending, crushing, 
and ransacking Nature is rendered justifiable and acceptable on the grounds that 
“Nature is cruel” – that is, Nature’s principle is the general one of which the main 
principle of human social interaction under the conditions of late capitalism 
(“Every man for himself”) is only a local and limited instance. If human beings 
are undoubtedly brutal, it is only because Nature itself is brutal, and we are, after 
all, a part and product of general Nature. Such are the problematic (if hidden) 
implications of reductivism. 
We should, I claim, be quite dogmatic on this point. Even if it could be shown 
that animals (above all, the so-called “higher” animals) exhibit some behaviours 
or capacities that appear to confirm the thesis of reductivism, nevertheless such a 
thesis should be withdrawn and withheld on principle and entirely a priori, not in 
order to reduce living beings to the status of objects to be manipulated and tossed 
aside by power, but rather so that they are absolved in advance of any 
responsibility for the consequences of power, or more precisely, for the effects of 
that sense of radical neediness and unsatisfactoriness that elicits and propels the 
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human existent’s insatiable lust for power. The surest sign that plants and animals 
are not like us is not that they do not speak but that they do not produce – that is, 
produce like us, in conformity to the inexorable, all-consuming logic of the will 
to more…, of desire. The way of Nature, Bataille pointed out a century ago, is 
growth followed by exudation, waste. Of all the known beings in the universe, 
only human beings reinvest their waste for the sake of ever more growth ad 
infinitum, with catastrophic consequences. If we thus deny plants and animals the 
word or the capacity to die, this is only in order that we might secure their 
innocence by denying them any complicity in the crimes which the beings in 
possession of those faculties have thus far been powerless to stop themselves from 
committing. The rampant devastation we are presently witnessing all around us is 
not merely an exacerbation of phenomena we encounter everywhere in Nature, 
but rather the profoundest expression of what we are. The ethical advantage of 
non-reductivism lies precisely here, namely, in that it both makes it possible and 
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